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Abstract
We present a household consumption model that accounts for caring house-
hold members, while allowing for noncooperative behavior in decisions on pub-
lic goods. The intrahousehold consumption outcome critically depends on the
degree of caring between the household members. By varying the degree of in-
trahousehold caring, the model encompasses a whole continuum of household
consumption models that are situated between the fully cooperative model
and the noncooperative model without caring. This feature is used to dene a
measure for the degree of cooperation within the household. We also establish
a dual characterization of our noncooperative model with caring preferences:
we show that the model is dually equivalent to a noncooperative model with
non-caring preferences that is characterized by intrahousehold transfers. Fi-
nally, following a revealed preference approach, we derive testable implications
of the model for empirical data. We demonstrate the practical usefulness of
the model through an illustrative application.
JEL Classication: D11, D12, D13, C14.
Keywords: household consumption, caring preferences, intrahousehold coop-
eration, Nash equilibrium, revealed preferences.
We thank seminar participants in Oxford for useful discussion. The usual disclaimer applies.
yCentER, Tilburg University, and Center for Economic Studies, University of Leuven. E. Sabbe-
laan 53, B-8500 Kortrijk, Belgium. E-mail: laurens.cherchye@kuleuven-kortrijk.be. Laurens Cher-
chye gratefully acknowledges nancial support from the Research Fund K.U.Leuven through the
grant STRT1/08/004.
zCenter for Economic Studies, University of Leuven, and Sherppa, University of Ghent. E.
Sabbelaan 53, B-8500 Kortrijk, Belgium. E-mail: thomas.demuynck@kuleuven-kortrijk.be. Thomas
Demuynck gratefully acknowledges the Fund for Scientic Research - Flanders (FWO-Vlaanderen)
for his postdoctoral fellowship.
xECARES-ECORE, Universit e Libre de Bruxelles. Avenue F. D. Roosevelt 50, CP 114, B-
1050 Brussels, Belgium. E-mail: bderock@ulb.ac.be. Bram De Rock gratefully acknowledges the
European Research Council (ERC) for his Starting Grant.
11 Introduction
Household members care for each other. But, at the same time, they may act non-
cooperatively when deciding on the publicly consumed goods within the household.
How can we account for this in modeling household consumption behavior? We
present a consumption model that can allow for various degrees of caring in the
household, while considering possibly noncooperative behavior. More specically, we
assume that household members have caring preferences in the Beckerian sense (also
referred to as altruistic preferences by Becker (1981)). We then model noncoopera-
tive behavior by assuming that households choose Nash equilibrium intrahousehold
allocations.
Our model ts within the so-called `non-unitary' approach to analyzing household
consumption behavior, which has become increasingly popular in the recent litera-
ture. Indeed, there is a growing consensus that multi-member consumption behavior
should no longer be modeled as resulting from the maximization of some common
household welfare function. This `unitary' approach to modeling household behav-
ior is methodologically unappealing and leads to testable implications (e.g. income
pooling and Slutsky symmetry) that are frequently rejected in empirical studies.1
Non-unitary household consumption models open the `black box' of household
behavior by taking into account that each household member has her/his own pref-
erences. Consumption decisions are then regarded as the outcome of specic intra-
household decision processes. In our non-unitary model, the outcome of the house-
hold decision process critically depends on the degree of caring between the household
members. By varying the degree of intrahousehold caring, the model encompasses
a whole continuum of household consumption models that are situated between the
fully cooperative model (with Pareto ecient intrahousehold allocations) and the
noncooperative model without caring (with Nash equilibrium allocations under non-
caring preferences). As such, our model provides a generalized perspective on mod-
eling household consumption with public goods. As we will discuss in Section 2,
the cooperative model and the noncooperative model without caring have been well-
documented in the literature. Each model has its own strengths and weaknesses. A
main objective of the current study is to develop a consumption model that combines
the attractive properties of the cooperative and noncooperative benchmark models,
while avoiding the associated weaknesses.
Our consumption model has a number of additional features that are particularly
1Alderman, Chiappori, Haddad, Hoddinot and Kanbur (1995), Vermeulen (2002) and Donni
(2008) provide more elaborate discussions of this topic. For empirical rejections of the unitary
model, see for example Lundberg (1988), Thomas (1990), Bourguignon, Browning, Chiappori and
Lechene (1993), Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1993), Fortin and Lacroix (1997), Phipps and Bur-
ton (1998), Browning and Chiappori (1998), Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002), Du
o (2003),
Vermeulen (2005) and Cherchye and Vermeulen (2008).
2attractive from a theoretical and/or practical perspective. First of all, as we will
argue in Section 3, it allows us to dene a measure of intrahousehold caring that
can also be interpreted as quantifying the degree of within-household cooperation.
Specically, we show that it is possible to quantify and estimate the degree of caring
within the household; and this gives us an operational measure for the magnitude of
intrahousehold cooperation. We see at least two reasons why it is important to know
this degree of intrahousehold cooperation. First, from a welfarist perspective, it gives
us an idea of the welfare improvement that is possible within a certain household.
If it is possible to link the level of cooperation to household characteristics, we may
use this knowledge for welfare enhancement measures that correct the eciency
loss originating from household behavior that is not fully cooperative. Second, the
extent of within-household cooperation is also important for the structure of optimal
taxation and policies that target to alter the intrahousehold income distribution.2 In
this respect, dierent (cooperative-noncooperative) consumption models may lead to
other intrahousehold allocations.
Another interesting feature of our model pertains to its dual representation, which
will be established in Section 4. Specically, we will show that the noncooperative
model with caring preferences is dually equivalent to a noncooperative model with
non-caring preferences that is characterized by intrahousehold transfers. In fact,
the intrahousehold transfers in the dual model will be directly related to the above
mentioned measure of intrahousehold cooperation. This duality result parallels the
well-known duality between a Pareto optimal allocation and the Lindahl equilibrium,
which is often used to provide a decentralized representation for the fully cooperative
(Pareto ecient) model of household consumption. As such, we obtain a similar
decentralized representation for our newly proposed model.
A nal important aspect of our model relates to its empirical applicability. In
Section 5 we will show that, although our newly proposed model generalizes the fully
cooperative and noncooperative models, it does have useful testable implications for
empirical data. To this end, we present a revealed preference characterization of the
model in the tradition of Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982): we derive necessary and
sucient conditions for the empirical validity of our model that can be checked by
solely using a nite set of observed household consumption bundles and correspond-
ing prices.3 Essentially, this revealed preference characterization directly applies the
theoretical implications of our consumption model to the observed household choices.
2See, for example, Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir (2005) for discussion of this targeting view
on tax policies. Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene (1994), Browning, Chiappori and
Lewbel (2006) and Lewbel and Pendakur (2008) focus on alternative welfare-related questions asso-
ciated with the intrahousehold income distribution in the context of the cooperative consumption
model.
3See also Samuelson (1938), Houthakker (1950) and Diewert (1973) for seminal contribution to
the revealed preference approach to modeling household consumption behavior.
3In our opinion, this makes it a natural starting point for investigating the empirical
usefulness of this newly proposed model. In this respect, we also indicate that the
revealed preference approach has been successfully applied for empirical analysis of
non-unitary consumption models: Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007, 2009,
2011) focus on the cooperative model, while Cherchye, Demuynck and De Rock
(2011) consider the noncooperative model without caring. In addition, as we will
discuss below, this revealed preference approach has some attractive advantages (as
compared to the more standard `dierential' approach) for analyzing multi-member
household consumption behavior. We will demonstrate the practical usefulness of
the revealed preference conditions by means of an illustrative application to data
taken from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS).
The concluding Section 6 will summarize our main results. In addition, it will
suggest a number of interesting avenues for follow-up research.
2 Non-unitary models of household consumption:
overview
Within the non-unitary approach, alternative household consumption models dif-
fer from each other in their modeling of the intrahousehold decision process. In
particular, we distinguish two main approaches in the existing literature. The rst
approach assumes that the household members behave cooperatively, which means
that they reach a Pareto-optimal allocation, i.e. no household member can increase
her/his utility without decreasing the utility of any other member.4 The second
approach assumes noncooperative behavior and excludes intrahousehold caring, i.e.
the household consumption allocation is a Nash equilibrium dened in terms of non-
caring preferences.5 In a household consumption setting with both privately and
publicly consumed goods, this implies a Nash equilibrium with household members
voluntarily contributing to the public goods. It is well known that, in this case, the
resulting level of public goods is generally below the cooperative (Pareto ecient)
level.
Both the cooperative model and the noncooperative model have their own strengths
and weaknesses. The defense of the noncooperative model without caring is almost
entirely based on its theoretical appeal. In particular, any Nash equilibrium is stable
4See, for example, Apps and Rees (1988), Chiappori (1988, 1992), Browning and Chiappori
(1998) and Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007, 2011). Following Chiappori (1988, 1992), the
consumption literature often refers to the cooperative model as the `collective' model of household
behavior.
5See, for example, Leuthold (1968), Bourguignon (1984), Ulph (1988), Kooreman and Kapteyn
(1990), Browning (2000), Chen and Woolley (2001), Lechene and Preston (2005, 2008), Browning,
Chiappori and Lechene (2010) and Cherchye, Demuynck and De Rock (2011).
4in the sense that no household member can increase her/his utility by unilaterally
changing her/his strategy. Moreover, using a backward induction argument, one
can show that this stability property remains even if we allow for nitely repeated
interaction.
Nevertheless, the noncooperative approach also has some deciencies. First of
all, it seems rather unrealistic {especially in a household setting{ to assume that
household members only care about their own wellbeing. This calls for including
caring preferences. Second, the household is normally viewed as a prime example
of an institution that it is very likely to overcome free-rider problems associated
with public consumption {at least to some extent. Specically, one may expect
that repeated interaction and (nearly) perfect information increase the probability
that household members develop welfare enhancing mechanisms to overrule such
problems.
Let us then consider the cooperative model. The premise of ecient behavior can
be defended in three ways (see, for example, Browning and Chiappori (1998)). First
of all, under perfect information and with repeated interactions {two conditions that
are likely to be satised within every household{ Pareto optimal allocations can be
stable as long as all members are suciently patient. Second, the Pareto outcome
is seen as a most natural generalization of the assumption of utility maximization
in the unitary model with several household members. Finally, Pareto eciency
is widely used as an assumption in cooperative bargaining models.6 In this sense,
Pareto optimality is a minimal condition that should be satised if the intrahousehold
bargaining process is based on such a cooperative solution concept.
Although we largely agree with these arguments, we also believe that there re-
mains scope for relaxing the eciency condition. First of all, it is well known that,
unless the Pareto optimal allocation exactly coincides with a Nash equilibrium, the
cooperative Pareto ecient outcome is not self enforcing. In other words, there will
usually be some household member(s) who can increase utility by unilaterally devi-
ating from the Pareto optimal allocation. Second, even if we are in a situation with
innitely repeated interaction, the folk theorem shows that almost every allocation
situated between the noncooperative Nash outcome and the Pareto ecient outcome
could be stable. In other words, (innitely) repeated interaction does not necessarily
lead to ecient behavior. Finally, the Pareto eciency assumption has been ques-
tioned for the publicly consumed goods. Most notably, it has been argued that the
informational requirement and the resulting cost of implementing cooperation may
often be unrealistic.
Summarizing, while the fully cooperative model might represent an overly opti-
6See Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy and Horney (1981) and Lundberg and Pollak (1993)
for applications of bargaining models in a household setting.
5mistic outlook of the household decision process, we may also argue that the non-
cooperative model without caring is too pessimistic. Indeed, it appears to us that
most households are to be found somewhere between the cooperative and nonco-
operative benchmarks. As noted by Alderman, Chiappori, Haddad, Hoddinot and
Kanbur (1995): `[The household] consists of individuals who { motivated at times by
altruism, at times by self interest, and often by both | cajole, cooperate, threaten,
help, argue, support, and, indeed, occasionally walk out on each other.'
In this paper, we present a new model of household behavior that encompasses
situations between the extreme cases of full cooperation and noncooperation without
caring. Formally, our model is equivalent to a noncooperative model where household
members have Beckerian caring preferences: each household member optimizes a
function that is increasing in the utilities of all household members.7 In this set-up,
we will derive specic testable restrictions for empirical data. Interestingly, we will
also demonstrate that it is possible to empirically recover a measure for the degree of
intrahousehold cooperation which, as we will explain, actually captures caring within
the household.
Thus, by introducing caring in the noncooperative framework, our model allows
us to combine some attractive properties of the cooperative model and the nonco-
operative model. At the same time, it solves two main problems associated with
the two benchmark models. First of all, as it is based on the concept of a non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium, it is self enforcing and, hence, stable. Second, by
introducing caring between the household members, we depart from the assumption
that these members are inherently egoistic (i.e. non-caring). Caring preferences allow
for friendship, altruism, love and trust between household members. We believe this
assumption to be much more realistic when dealing with institutions like households,
where these emotions do play an important role.
As a nal remark, it is worth to note that d'Aspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira
(2009) provide an alternative household consumption model that is situated between
the fully cooperative and the noncooperative model. A most important dierence
with our model is that these authors model `semicooperative' behavior by param-
eterizing the trade-o between an individual budget constraint and the household
budget constraint (which evaluates the public goods at Lindahl prices). By contrast,
the distinguishing feature of our approach is that it combines caring preferences with
noncooperative intrahousehold interaction for modeling the household decision be-
havior. See also the concluding section for a further comparison between our model
and the model of d'Aspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira (in terms of testable impli-
cations).
7In this respect, it is also worth referring to Browning and Lechene (2001), who adopt a similar
approach to investigate the relationship between expenditures (on private and public goods) and
the intrahousehold distribution of income.
63 A noncooperative model with caring preferences
We consider a household with two members, A and B.8 The household decides over
the purchase of a bundle of N private goods, denoted by q 2 RN
+, and a bundle of K
intrahousehold public goods, denoted by Q 2 RK
+. We remark that this assumes that
each good is either private (in q) or public (in Q). Further, it excludes externalities
associated with privately consumed quantities. Importantly, however, our setting can
actually account for such externalities. Specically, if an individual is the exclusive
consumer of a particular private good, then we can account for externalities for
this good by formally treating it as a public good. Throughout, we will treat the
rst private good as a numeraire and we will assume that the consumption of the
numeraire and all public goods is strictly positive in all household equilibria.9
In what follows, we will rst formalize our assumptions regarding the preferences
and the strategies of the household members. Subsequently, we will formally dene
and characterize the household equilibrium in terms of our model.
Preferences: Our analysis starts from a set of decision situations T. In each
situation t, the household faces a price vector pt 2 RN
++ for the private goods, a
price vector Pt 2 RK
++ for the public goods, and a household income Yt 2 R++.
In addition, members A and B are endowed with situation-dependent concave and
increasing (Beckerian) caring functions. We denote these functions by W A
t (UA;UB)
and W B
t (UB;UA); in this construction, UA and UB stand for `egoistic' utility func-
tions which (only) depend on the members' own consumption of private goods (qA
and qB) and the total amount of public goods (Q), i.e. UA = UA(qA;Q) and UB =
UB(qB;Q). Of course, the vectors representing the individual consumption of the
private goods should add up to the total household consumption of these goods, i.e.
qA + qB = q. In contrast to the caring functions W A
t and W B
t , we assume that the
utility functions UA and UB are stable (invariant) across all decision situations t in
T. Indeed, if these functions were also situation-dependent, then our model would
have no testable implications. Further, we will assume that utility functions UA and
UB are continuous, concave, non-satiated and non-decreasing in their arguments.
An important feature of our model is that the caring functions W A
t and W B
t
are situation-dependent. This is a natural assumption in a non-unitary framework.
Specically, it re
ects the idea that the degree of caring or altruism between house-
hold members might depend on several (situation-dependent) exogenous variables.10
8This focus on two-member households is mainly to keep the exposition simple. However, our
following analysis can readily be extended to households with more than two members.
9We can relax this assumption by using suitable Lagrange multipliers, but this would only
increase notational complexity without adding new insights. In fact, our own empirical application
in Section 5 will consider data sets with some components of the public goods equal to zero.
10Compare with the discussion in Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2006). These authors
7These variables are analogous to the so-called extra-environmental parameters in the
terminology of McElroy and Horney (1981) or distribution factors in the terminology
of Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene (1994). They come in two kinds.
On the one hand, exogenous variables may in
uence the decision process within the
household. Examples of such variables are the state of the marriage market, the
state of the labor market, the specic divorce laws and the social attitudes to the
roles of men and women within the household. On the other hand, exogenous vari-
ables may impact on the emotional state of the household members. Examples of
such variables are the amounts of love, friendship, compassion and trust within the
household. Both kinds of variables may have a strong in
uence on the shape of the
caring functions. Taking the caring functions to be situation-dependent allows the
model to adapt to a change in each of these (typically unobserved) variables.
In what follows, we will make one additional assumption to facilitate our technical
analysis. Specically, we use a single crossing (SC) property:
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The left hand side of the last inequality provides the amount of utility UA that A
is willing to subsume to compensate a one unit increase in UB. In other words, it gives
the slope of the indierence curve of the function W A





), i.e. the marginal rate of substitution between UA and UB. Assumption SC




, the slope of the indierence
curve for W A
t through this point is steeper then the slope of the indierence curve of
W B
t through this point. Intuitively, this single crossing condition implies that, when
compared to member B, member A gives at least the same weight to her own utility
UA as to the utility of the other member UB. Symmetrically, B gives relatively more
weight to UB then to UA in comparison to A. We believe this to be an intuitively
plausible assumption. Observe that Assumption SC is entirely ordinal. In other
words, it is insensitive to any monotonic transformation of W A
t ;W B
t ;UA or UB.
Strategies: In order to combine noncooperation and caring in one and the same
formal model, we make the following assumption regarding the household members'
consider (situation-dependent) aggregation of preferences in a cooperative framework.
8strategies. At every decision situation t, each household member decides on three
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We interpret as follows. The bundle q
A;A
t is the bundle of private goods that member
A buys for herself, q
A;B
t is the bundle of private goods that A buys for the other
member B, and QA
t is the contribution to the bundle of public goods purchased by



















It is standard in the literature on noncooperative household behavior to explicitly
distinguish between A and B's contribution to the household's public consumption
(e.g. Lechene and Preston (2005, 2008), and d'Aspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira
(2009) make similar distinctions). However, the fact that we allow A and B to buy
private goods for each other may seem a bit unconventional. In most models (of
noncooperative behavior) it is assumed that members only buy private goods for
themselves, i.e. A chooses qA
t and B chooses qB





t (for M;L 2 fA;Bg, M 6= L) directly relates to the specicity of our model, i.e.
it accounts for caring preferences in a noncooperative setting.
Let us explain this last point in some more detail. In a noncooperative model
without caring preferences, it seems intuitive that individual members will not buy
private goods for the other. By contrast, in the case of intrahousehold caring, one
household member may well benet from increasing the private consumption of the




t exactly takes this into ac-
count.11 In fact, in many real life situations one household member eectively buys
private consumption goods for the other member. Examples are abundant: the wife
goes shopping and buys food for everyone and clothes for her husband; the husband
lls the car with gasoline while the wife takes the car to go to the gym; etc.
Equilibrium: We will rst introduce our new concept of household equilibrium
in general terms. Subsequently, we will show that the concept encompasses the
fully cooperative equilibrium and the noncooperative equilibrium without caring as
limiting cases. This demonstrates the generality of our model. Furthermore, it will
enable us to interpret our measure of intrahousehold caring as quantifying the degree
of within-household cooperation, i.e. the measure allows us to distinguish between
dierent consumption models characterized by dierent of degrees of cooperation.
We assume that in equilibrium both members maximize their caring functions
given the decisions of the other members, i.e. we assume a noncooperative Nash
11Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2010) suggest a similar idea in the context of a noncoopera-
tive model with one private good and one public good, where one individual has caring preferences
while the other individual is egoistic. In fact, a similar mechanism also underlies Becker's rotten
kid theorem.











































































An allocation that solves both problems simultaneously is called a household
equilibrium with caring.










t g is a household equilib-
rium with caring if and only if it simultaneously solves OP-A and OP-B.
Our new model enables us to dene a measure of intrahousehold caring. To for-
malize this idea, let @UM(qM;Q)=@q1 represent the marginal utility of the numeraire
(i.e. the rst private good) for member M 2 fA;Bg at the allocation fqM;Qg. Then,














In words, the function value M
k (qM;Q) gives member M's marginal willingness to





for the partial derivative of the utility function UM with respect to
the consumption quantity of the private good n, and
@UM
@Qk
for the partial derivative of the function
UM associated with the quantity of the public good k.
10We can now derive the following result. (The proofs of our main results are given
in Appendix A.)










t g be a household equilibrium with
caring. Then, there exist numbers A
t ;B


























It follows from the proof of this proposition that the values of the indices A
t and
B
t are determined by the curvatures of the caring functions W A
t and W B
t at equi-
librium, which actually capture the degree of intrahousehold caring.13 Assumption
SC guarantees that A
t and B
t are both contained in the unit interval. In the next
section, we will use the dual representation of our consumption model to provide a
specic equilibrium interpretation for the equality condition in Proposition 1.
To further enhance the intuition of our newly proposed model, we consider the
two natural benchmark cases, i.e. the fully cooperative model and the noncooperative
model without caring. In terms of Denition 1 (and problems OP-A and OP-B),
if the caring functions W A
t and W B
t coincide (i.e. W A
t = W B
t = Wt), then both
members optimize the same objective function. By construction, this implies a co-
operative equilibrium (i.e. a Pareto optimal intrahousehold allocation). In this case,
the caring function Wt corresponds to a so-called generalized (Samuelson) house-
hold welfare function (see, for example, Apps and Rees (2009)). By varying Wt, any
Pareto ecient allocation can be reached as a household equilibrium with caring. By
contrast, if the caring functions reduce to `egoistic' functions (i.e. W A
t (UA;UB) = UA
and W B
t (UB;UA) = UB), then the household equilibrium reduces to a noncooper-
ative equilibrium without caring. Our model is general in that it also captures all
possible equilibrium situations between the fully cooperative equilibrium and the
noncooperative equilibrium without caring
Using the same two benchmark models, we can eectively interpret the indices
A
t and B
t in Proposition 1 as capturing the degree of cooperation at the equilibrium
intrahousehold allocation. First, in a cooperative equilibrium the MWTP functions
M
k coincide with the so-called Lindahl prices. In particular, it is well known that any
Pareto ecient allocation fqA
t ;qB
t ;Qtg must satisfy the Lindahl-Bowen-Samuelson




































, where all partial derivatives are evaluated at the allocation
fqA
t ;qB
t ;Qtg. In words, A
t equals the ratio of member B's marginal valuation for a unit increase of
the numeraire quantity for member A (which enters the caring function WB
t through UA) relative
to his marginal valuation for the same increase of the numeraire quantity for his own (which enters
WB
t through UB). Likewise, the variable B
t equals the ratio of A's marginal valuation for a unit
increase of the numeraire quantity for B relative to her marginal valuation for the same quantity
increase for her own.










t ;Qt) = Pt;k:
In words, the sum of the members' MWTP must sum to the market prices. This
case coincides with A
t = B
t = 1 in Proposition 1.
We next turn to the noncooperative model. In this case we get the following









t ;Qt)g = Pt;k;
see, for example, Cherchye, Demuynck and De Rock (2011). Thus, this case corre-
sponds to A
t = B
t = 0 in Proposition 1.
More generally, if the indices A
t and B
t are closer to unity, the household will
behave more as in the cooperative model. The duality result in Section 4 will provide
an additional interpretation of A
t and B
t as quantifying the degree of intrahousehold
cooperation of each member. In Section 5 we will show that it is possible to empir-
ically recover the values of A
t and B
t . In this respect, we also note that maxfA
t ,
B
t g < 1 implies A
k (qA
t ;Qt) + B
k (qB
t ;Qt) > Pt;k (because of Proposition 1), which
reveals Pareto inecient behavior. As such, A
t and B
t also indicate the extent of
Pareto (in)eciency at each decision situation t.
As a nal remark, we note that the values of A
t and B
t are situation-dependent
in the general version of our model. In practice, one may impose A
t = A and
B
t = B for all t, which thus assumes a constant degree of intrahousehold cooperation
over all decision situations. Again, this encompasses the fully cooperative model
(with A = B = 1) and the noncooperative model without caring (with A =
B = 0) as limiting cases. As a specic illustration, we will consider such constant
intrahousehold cooperation in our empirical application in Section 5.
4 A duality result
The second fundamental theorem of welfare economics provides one of the most im-
portant theoretical insights related to the concept of Pareto eciency. Specically,
provided that some regularity conditions are satised, any Pareto optimal alloca-
tion can be dually characterized in terms of a suitable income distribution and by
making use of individual Lindahl prices for the publicly consumed goods (see, for
example, Bergstrom (1976)). This dual characterization of Pareto optimality has
often been used to provide a decentralized two-stage representation of the fully co-
operative model of household consumption: in the rst stage, the household divides
the total income over the household members; in the second stage, each individual
12member chooses a consumption allocation that maximizes her/his utility subject to
the personalized budget constraint dened in the rst stage.
In this section, we will develop a similar duality result for the noncooperative
model with caring preferences that we introduced above: we will show that this
model is dually equivalent to a noncooperative model with non-caring preferences
that is characterized by intrahousehold transfers. The magnitude of these transfers
will be directly related to the MWTP functions A
k and B
k and the indices A
t and B
t
introduced in the previous section. In turn, this duality result implies a decentral-
ized representation of the model that contains two stages. As we will explain, this
representation will provide a further motivation to interpret A
t and B
t as measuring
the degree of intrahousehold cooperation.
Before formally stating the duality result, we rst explain the two stages of the
noncooperative household model with transfers. In the rst stage, the total household
income Yt is divided between A and B, which denes the individual incomes Y A
t and
Y B
t (with Y A
t + Y B
t = Yt). Here, we abstract from explicitly modeling this rst step.
Similar to our treatment of caring functions in the previous section, this intrahouse-
hold income distribution can be seen as a function of situation-dependent exogenous
variables (i.e. the so-called extra-environmental parameters or distribution factors).
In the concluding section, we discuss the possibility to more carefully investigate
this rst step income distribution as an interesting avenue for follow-up research.
At this point, we indicate that the idea of an intrahousehold income distribution
resembles the so-called `sharing rule' concept that applies to the fully cooperative
model: in the decentralized representation of this model, the sharing equally denes
the within-household income distribution underlying the (in casu Pareto ecient)
household consumption decisions.14
In the second stage of the allocation process, each household member M (= A
or B) decides on the optimal level of her/his own private consumption and the
own contribution to the level of public goods, by maximizing her/his own utility
UM(qM;Q) subject to a personalized budget constraint dened by the individual
income. In doing so, the individual faces the price vectors pt and Pt for her/his
choice of private consumption qM
t and public contribution QM
t . In addition, each
individual receives a transfer from the other individual per unit of public good that





t represent the corresponding vectors of intrahousehold transfers.
14In fact, Chiappori (1988, 1992) originally introduced this sharing rule concept for the model
without public goods. In the literature on the cooperative model, a renement of the concept
that accounts for public goods is the so-called `conditional' sharing rule. This concept captures
how the group shares the income to be spent on private consumption for the given level of public
consumption; see, for example, Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir (2005) for discussion. As such, this
rst step income distribution concept is not fully comparable to ours, which is not conditional on
the level of public consumption.
13There are at least two interpretations for these intrahousehold transfers related
to public goods. First, one can see these transfers as voluntary contributions: as
B benets from the purchase of QA
t;k, it may be the case that she/he is willing to
contribute to the purchase of this bundle. Next, one can also interpret them as
representing an implicit tax that B has to pay for the benet of receiving QA
t;k. Both
interpretations express that intrahousehold transfers (i.e. a given specication of
A
t and B
t ) refer to the degree of (voluntary or obligatory) cooperation within the
household.



























































It is easy to see that the two budget constraints add up to the household budget
constraint at equilibrium (i.e. p0
tqt + P0
tQt  Yt).
Importantly, the noncooperative model under study does not explicitly consider
caring preferences: in contrast to the model discussed in the previous section, the
problems DOP-A and DOP-B do not include the caring functions W A
t and W B
t but
only use the `egoistic' functions UA and UB. However, as we will explain, our follow-
ing concept of a household equilibrium with transfers accounts for caring preferences
in an indirect way.




t g is a household equilibrium with trans-
fers if and only if it simultaneously solves DOP-A and DOP-B and, in addition,
there exist A
t and B


















In this denition, an equilibrium household allocation requires that each member
M's intrahousehold transfer related to public good k (M
t;k) is proportional to M's
MWTP for k (M
k (qM
t ;Qt)). The factor of proportionality is giving by the index
M
t . Denition 2 establishes a direct link between the noncooperative model with
caring introduced in the previous section (with problems OP-A and OP-B) and the
two-stage allocation process discussed here (with problems DOP-A and DOP-B).





t . As such, the condition on the intrahousehold transfers in
Denition 2 indirectly incorporates caring preferences in the household equilibrium
under consideration.
Interestingly, Denition 2 provides an additional interpretation of each index
M
t in terms of intrahousehold cooperation. Given member M's MWTP for the
public good k (M
k (qM
t ;Qt)), M
t captures the transfer M is willing to give to the
other member L (L 6= M) if L purchases an additional unit of good k. In the fully
cooperative case, M is willing to donate the full amount M
k (qB
t ;Qt) to L, which
means M
t = 1. In this case, Denition 2 coincides with the standard denition of a
Lindahl equilibrium. By contrast, in the noncooperative case without caring, M will
not donate anything to L, so that M
t = 0. Now, Denition 2 reduces to the usual
denition of a noncooperative equilibrium without caring. Apart from these fully
cooperative and noncooperative cases, Denition 2 also includes the intermediate
case in which M picks a number M




t ;Qt) to L. Generally, a higher (lower) M
t means that M is
willing to cooperate more (less) with L.
Using Denition 2, we get the following rst order conditions for DOP-A and


























This condition is identical to the equilibrium condition in Proposition 1. However,
the underlying interpretation is dierent, because we now start from the optimization
problems DOP-A and DOP-B rather than OP-A and OP-B.
By considering A
t and B
t as capturing intrahousehold transfers, we can pro-
vide an intuitive equilibrium interpretation to the above equality condition. To see






t ;Qt) > Pt;k then the total amount that A is willing to spend for an addi-
tional unit of public good k (i.e. A's MWTP plus the fraction B
t of B's MWTP)
exceeds the price A has to pay (i.e. Pt;k). In this case, A will eectively increase




























t ;Qt)g < Pt;k, then either A
or B (whoever contributes positively to good k) will want to decrease her/his con-
tribution to k. Again, this implies a disequilibrium situation.
We are now in a position to establish the dual equivalence result mentioned above.
Specically, the following proposition implies that the household model with caring
and the household model with transfers are empirically indistinguishable.
15Proposition 2 Let UA and UB be a pair of utility functions. Then, the following











t g is a household equilibrium with car-
ing.
Then, there exist individual incomes Y A
t and Y B
t (with Y A
t + Y B
t = Yt) and
indices A
t and B










t g is a household equilibrium with transfers.
Then, there exist caring functions W A
t and W B


































t g is a household equilibrium with
caring.
5 Testable implications
So far, we have focused on the theoretical properties of our household model with
caring (or, equivalently, with transfers). In this section, we show that the model has
useful testable implications for empirical data. Specically, we will focus on testable
conditions in terms of revealed preferences. As indicated in the introduction, this
revealed preference approach has been successfully applied for empirical analysis
of non-unitary consumption models. In addition, recent methodological advances
of Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2003, 2008) greatly enhanced the empirical
usefulness of this revealed preference approach.
In the household consumption literature, empirical studies usually build on a
dierential characterization (rather than a revealed preference characterization) of
household consumption models. The specic feature of this dierential approach is
that it focuses on properties of functions representing household consumption be-
havior (e.g. cost, indirect utility and demand functions),15 whereas the revealed
preference approach (only) uses a nite set of household consumption observations.
In this respect, Cherchye, De Rock and Demuynck (2011) point out that the revealed
preference approach has some attractive features as compared to the more common
dierential approach for analyzing non-unitary consumption behavior. Most notably,
15The term `dierential' refers to the fact that the characterization is obtained by integrating
and/or dierentiating the functional specications of the fundamentals of the model (e.g. the
individual preferences of the household members). For dierential characterizations of non-unitary
consumption models, see Browning and Chiappori (1998) and Chiappori and Ekeland (2006, 2009),
who focused on the cooperative model, and Lechene and Preston (2005, 2008), who considered the
noncooperative model without caring.
16contrary to existing results for the dierential approach, the revealed preference char-
acterization of the noncooperative model (without caring) is independent from (or
non-nested with) the characterization of the cooperative model: a set of observations
that satises the cooperative conditions does not necessarily satisfy the noncoopera-
tive conditions, and vice versa. More generally, this implies that models characterized
by dierent degrees of intrahousehold cooperation (or caring) are independent of each
other in terms of their revealed preference characterization. Clearly, this indepen-
dence makes it interesting to compare the empirical validity of the dierent models.
This is particularly relevant in the present context, as our empirical exercise will
carry out such a comparison.
In our empirical exercise, we will apply the revealed preference conditions to
analyze data taken from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS). This
application will demonstrate the practical relevance of the household model with
caring. In addition, it will show that the revealed preference conditions allow us to
recover the indices A
t and B
t , which -to recall- capture the degree of intrahousehold
cooperation for behavior that is consistent with the model.
Revealed preference characterization: We start from a nite set of jTj ob-
served decision situations (or `observations'), i.e. S = fpt;Pt;qt;Qtgt2T. We re-
mark that this implies minimal conditions on what is observed. In particular, we
assume that at each observation t we only observe the price vectors pt and Pt and
the household consumption bundles qt and Qt.
Given our discussion in the previous sections, we consider the following denition
of rationalizability.
Denition 3 Consider a data set S = fpt;Pt;qt;Qtgt2T. We say that S is ratio-
nalizable with caring if there exist utility functions UA and UB and, for each decision
situation t, there exist caring functions W A
t and W B


































t g is a household equilibrium with caring:
Before providing testable revealed preference conditions for rationalizability, we
brie
y recapture a result of Varian (1982; based on Afriat, 1967). Consider a nite
set of jLj observations, i.e. a set Z = fwl;xlgl2L containing price vectors wl and
quantity vectors xl. Then, we say that this set Z can be rationalized by a utility
function U if each quantity bundle xl maximizes the function U in the following
sense:
xl 2 argmax





17Varian (1982) has shown that such a rationalizing utility function U exists if and
only if the set Z satises the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP).
Denition 4 Consider a set Z = fwl;xlgl2L. For any l1;l2 2 L, xl1RDxl2 if
wl1xl1  wl1xl2. Next, xl1RDxl2 if there exist a sequence r;:::;t (with r;:::;t 2 L)
such that xl1RDxr,...,xtRDxl2. The set Z satises GARP if, for all l1;l2 2 L,
xl1RDxl2 implies wl2xl1  wl2xl2.
Using Denition 4, we can characterize a data set S that is rationalizable with
caring.
Proposition 3 Consider a data set S = fpt;Pt;qt;Qtgt2T. The following condi-
tions are equivalent:
1. The data set S = fpt;Pt;qt;Qtgt2T is rationalizable with caring.





















































t ;Qtgt2T satisfy garp. (S.3)










t;k < Pt;k then Q
A
t;k = 0 and Q
B







t;k < Pt;k then Q
B
t;k = 0 and Q
A
t;k = Qt;k. (S.5)
The explanation is as follows. The restriction S.1 requires the individual con-
sumption bundles for the private goods to sum to the demanded household bundle
of private goods. The restriction S.2 corresponds to the equilibrium condition for
the public goods k in Proposition 1 (for a positive consumption of the public good
k). Condition S.3 states that rationalizability implies a GARP condition at the level
of individuals A and B, which corresponds to the existence of the individual utility
functions UA and UB in Denition 3. The specicity of our model is that these
GARP conditions use MWTP vectors ( A
t and  B
t ) for evaluating the publicly con-




t;k < Pt;k (A
t A
t;k + B
t;k < Pt;k), then A (B) will sell back any positive
amount of the public good k. This implies QA
t;k = 0 (QB




18Testing and recovery: In Appendix B, we show that the revealed preference
conditions in Proposition 3 can be reformulated in mixed integer programming (MIP)
terms. This complements existing MIP characterizations of the cooperative model
(in Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2011)) and the noncooperative model without
caring (in Cherchye, Demuynck and De Rock (2011)). The attractive feature of the
MIP characterization is that it allows for checking consistency of a given data S with
the conditions in Proposition 3. In the spirit of Varian (1982), we refer to this as
`testing' data consistency with the model under study.16
More specically, we demonstrate in Appendix B that all constraints of the MIP
formulation are linear for xed A
t and B
t . Linearity implies that the above program
can be solved by standard MIP methods for a given data set S. If we do not know
the values of A
t and B
t (which is usually the case), then we suggest to conduct
a grid search that checks the above problem (through MIP methods) for a whole
range of possible values for A
t and B
t . In our empirical application, we will assume
constant A
t and B
t , i.e. A
t = A and B
t = B for all t; and we will use an equally
sparse grid search with step 0:1 for A;B 2 [0;1], which implies that we consider
121 dierent combinations of A and B. The fact that the parameters A and B
are independent of t will simplify our presentation of the empirical results. The
underlying assumption is that the degree of intrahousehold cooperation does not
change over the observations. It is possible to relax this assumption, but this would
come at the cost of a considerable increase of the computational complexity of the
testable MIP conditions.
If observed behavior is consistent with our model with caring (i.e. the set S
is rationalizable with caring), then a natural next question pertains to recover-
ing/identifying structural features of the decision model that underlies the (ratio-
nalizable) observed consumption behavior. In our application, we will illustrate
recovery/identication of values for A and B (assuming A
t = A and B
t = B for
all t; see above) that are consistent with a rationalization of a given set S. Given
our discussion in the preceding sections, these values can be interpreted in terms of
intrahousehold cooperation (or caring) that is revealed in the observed consumption
behavior. Other recovery questions may pertain to the MWTP values M
t;k(qM;Q)
and individual income shares Y M
t at equilibrium (in terms of the household model
with transfers; see Denition 2). Generally, such recovery can start from the MIP
methodology presented in this paper. In this respect, we can refer to Cherchye, De
Rock and Vermeulen (2011), who consider these questions for the cooperative model;
their analysis is directly extended to the noncooperative model with caring discussed
here. These authors' basic argument is that revealed preference recovery on the basis
16As is standard in the revealed preference literature, the type of tests that we consider here are
`sharp' tests; either a data set satises the data consistency conditions or it does not.
19of an MIP characterization of rational behavior boils down to dening feasible sets
characterized by the MIP constraints.
As for recovery of the individual income shares, one important nal remark per-
tains to restrictions S.4 and S.5 in Proposition 3: As we will explain below, these
restrictions imply that the shares Y A
t and Y B
t that underlie observed (rationalizable)
behavior are not identiable in general. This contrasts with the cooperative case in
which the within-household income distribution (in general) can be identied from
the observed set S. This identiability result does not generally hold under nonco-
operative behavior with caring. As a matter of fact, this identiability problem for
our model actually parallels a similar problem for the noncooperative model without
caring.17
To see the identiability problem, we rst note that the budget constraints in









































Thus, because of conditions S.4 and S.5 we obtain that Y A
t and Y B
t are uniquely
identied only if for all k and t we have A
t;k + B
t B
t;k < Pt;k (so that QA
t;k = 0 and
QB
t;k = Qt;k) or B
t;k + A
t A
t;k < Pt;k (so that QB
t;k = 0 and QA
t;k = Qt;k). In terms of
the noncooperative model without caring, this last situation would conform to the
so-called separate spheres concept.18
On the other hand, as soon as there is one public good k to which both individuals






t;k = Pt;k), it is impossible to exactly
recover the income shares Y A
t and Y B
t are consistent with a rationalization of the
given data. Specically, in this case QA
t;k and QB
t;k can take any value (under the
sole condition QA
t;k + QB
t;k = Qt;k) and, thus, the expenditures on good k cannot be
assigned to the individual household members. Interestingly, this last result complies
with the so-called local income pooling result for the noncooperative model without
caring.19
Empirical Illustration: To demonstrate the practical usefulness of the revealed
preference conditions in Proposition 3, we provide a brief empirical illustration.
17See Cherchye, Demuynck and De Rock (2011) for more discussion on the identication of indi-
vidual income shares on the basis of testable revealed preference conditions for the noncooperative
model without caring.
18See, for example, Lundberg and Pollak (1993) and Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2010).
19See, for example, Kemp (1984), Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) and Browning, Chiap-
pori and Lechene (2010). Importantly, even though we cannot identify Y A
t and Y B
t under jointly
contributed public goods, it is still possible to recover upper and lower bounds on values for Y A
t
and Y B
t that are consistent with a rationalization with caring of the given data set. These bounds
then account for the total (non-assignable) expenditures on the jointly contributed public goods.
20Specically, we consider an application of our rationalizability restrictions to data
taken from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS). Cherchye, De Rock
and Vermeulen (2009, 2011) conducted a revealed preference analysis of these data
in terms of the cooperative model, while Cherchye, Demuynck and De Rock (2011)
analyzed consistency with the noncooperative model without caring. For compact-
ness, we refer to these authors for a detailed discussion of the data. We extend these
earlier studies by analyzing the same data in terms of our noncooperative model with
caring.
The data set consists of 148 adult couples, with both (female and male) household
members employed. For each separate household, the data set has 8 (= jTj) observa-
tions (prices and quantities) on 21 nondurable goods: 3 public goods and 18 private
goods (K = 3 and N = 18).20 Each household is considered separately, which avoids
(debatable) preference homogeneity assumptions across males or females of dierent
households. As such, the degree of cooperation may vary for dierent households. As
for each individual household, we assume the degree of intrahousehold cooperation is
constant over all observed decision situations, i.e. we consider A
t = A and B
t = B
for all t. This considerably facilitates our following discussion. In this respect, we
recall that the fully cooperative model and the noncooperative model without caring
correspond to A = B = 1 and A = B = 0, respectively.
To focus our discussion, we directly build on an empirical nding of Cherchye, De-
muynck and De Rock (2011). Starting from the original sample with 148 households,
these authors identied two households (1 and 2) that seem particularly interesting
to illustrate the empirical usefulness of our newly proposed model: household 1 can
be rationalized in terms of the noncooperative model but not in terms of the cooper-
ative model, and household 2 can be rationalized in terms of the cooperative model
but not in terms of the noncooperative model. For ease of exposition, we will only
report rationalizability results for these two households.21
Table 1 gives results for our (MIP) rationalizability test (1 = pass; 0 = fail) that
correspond to 121 combinations of A;B 2 [0;1]. Interestingly, these results suggest
that revealed preference conditions can be useful to identify values for A and B
that are consistent with rationalizable behavior. Given that A and B indicate the
degree of cooperation of each individual household member, these values tell us about
20The public goods are (1) wood fuel, (2) gas fuel and (3) housing rent. The private goods are
(1) food outside the home, (2) clothing, (3) car fuel, (4) luxury goods, (5) services, (6) bread,
(7) potatoes, (8) vegetables, (9) fruit, (10) meat, (11) dairy products, (12) fat, (13) sugar, (14)
eggs, (15) sh, (16) other food items, (17) alcohol and (18) tobacco. Following Cherchye, De
Rock and Vermeulen (2011), we use assignable information for the private goods. Specically, our
following results pertains to fully observing the private quantities qA
t and qB
t in Proposition 3.
Generally, using assignable information enhances the power of the empirical analysis. However,
strictly speaking it is not needed for such empirical analysis to be possible (e.g., the testable
conditions in Proposition 3 do not require such information).
21Results for other households are available upon request.
21the extent to which observed household consumption behavior is characterized by
(limited) intrahousehold cooperation. For example, for household 1 consistency with
the rationalizability conditions in Proposition 3 holds if A;B  0:6 (conditional on
the grid search that we conducted). Similarly, for household 2 rationalizability holds
if A  0:6 and B  0:4:
In fact, these results show that the degree of cooperation in the household equi-
librium may vary across households (e.g. households 1 and 2 are characterized by
dierent values for A and B) and household members (e.g. A and B have dier-
ent values for household 2). In our opinion, an interesting following step can relate
these ndings on (varying) intrahousehold cooperation to specic characteristics of
the household and/or household members. Such an exercise falls beyond the scope
of the current study (also because of limited data availability). But the results in
Table 1 clearly suggest that our model with caring (and the corresponding revealed
preference conditions) provides a useful theoretical basis for empirically addressing
this type of questions.
Apart from test results, Table 1 also provides power estimates for the two house-
holds and the rationalizability tests that we consider (corresponding to dierent
combinations of A and B). Indeed, discriminatory power is often conceived as an
important consideration to evaluate a particular behavioral model, and to compare
dierent models, in terms of practical usefulness. In our specic context, it there-
fore seems interesting to compare the power of consumption models characterized by
dierent degrees of intrahousehold cooperation.
For a given data set, power quanties the probability of detecting (simulated)
behavior that is not consistent with the behavioral model subject to testing; we
will refer to such inconsistent behavior as `random' behavior. In our application,
we simulate random behavior by using a bootstrap method.22 For each household,
we simulate 1000 random series of eight consumption choices by constructing, for
each of the eight observed household budgets, a random quantity bundle exhausting
the given budget (for the corresponding prices); we construct these random quantity
bundles by drawing budget shares (for the 21 goods) from the set of 1184 (= 148
x 8) observed household choices in the original data set. The power measure is
then calculated as one minus the proportion of the randomly generated consumption
series that are consistent with the model under evaluation. By using this bootstrap
method, our power assessment gives information on the expected distribution of
violations under random choice, while incorporating information on the households'
actual choices.
From Table 1, we learn that, for both households under study, the power is
22See Bronars (1987), Andreoni and Harbaugh (2006) and Beatty and Crawford (2010) for general
discussions on alternative procedures to evaluate power in the context of revealed preference tests
such as ours.
22about the same for the dierent combinations of A and B that we consider. In
fact, the power of `intermediate' models with A; B 2 [0;1] is generally closely
similar to the power of the `extreme' fully cooperative and noncooperative models
(with, respectively, A = B = 1 and A = B = 0) . In our opinion, this provides
an empirical motivation for considering non-unitary models with various degrees
of cooperation when analyzing household consumption behavior. In some cases,
a household model with limited intrahousehold cooperation may provide a better
description of the actual household consumption behavior than models with full or
without any cooperation.
[Table 1 about here]
6 Conclusion
We have presented a model for analyzing household consumption behavior that simul-
taneously accounts for caring preferences and noncooperative behavior in decisions
on public goods. Interestingly, by varying the degree of intrahousehold caring, the
model encompasses a whole continuum of household consumption models situated
between the fully cooperative model and the noncooperative model without caring.
Attractively, our newly proposed model also allowed us to dene a measure for the
degree of intrahousehold cooperation. Following a revealed preference approach, we
derived the testable implications of the model for empirical data. We have illustrated
our theoretical discussion through an empirical application to RLMS data. This ap-
plication suggested the empirical relevance of considering a noncooperative model
with caring in addition to the fully cooperative model and the noncooperative model
without caring. In addition, it demonstrated the possibility to empirically recover
our measure for the degree of cooperation within a particular household.
We see at least three interesting directions for follow-up research. First, in
the (two-stage) dual representation of our model as characterized by intrahouse-
hold transfers (see Section 4), we have taken the (rst stage) intrahousehold income
distribution as exogenously given. In this respect, we recall that the methodology
presented in Section 5 eectively allows for recovering the income distribution as-
sociated with observed household behavior that is found to be consistent with our
model. A natural following step of the analysis may relate this income distribution
to dierent (household or member specic) factors that impact on it. In fact, such
research would be similar in spirit to existing research focusing on `distribution fac-
tors' in the context of the cooperative model of household consumption. See, for
example, Bourguignon, Browning and Chiappori (2009) for a recent discussion of
23testable implications (for this cooperative model) that are induced by distribution
factors.
Second, in Section 5 we have adopted a revealed preference approach to estab-
lish the testable implications of the newly proposed model. Because this revealed
preference approach directly applies the theoretical implications of our model to the
observed consumption behavior, we believe it is natural to adopt this approach as a
rst assessment tool for the empirical applicability of our newly proposed consump-
tion model. In addition, as we have discussed, this revealed preference approach
has proven to be particularly successful for empirical analysis of non-unitary con-
sumption models. Furthermore, we have argued that the approach has a number
of attractive features as compared to the more traditional dierential approach to
characterizing non-unitary consumption models. However, we also believe that an
interesting extension of the results in this paper consists of developing the dieren-
tial counterparts of the conditions presented in Section 5. Such an extension would
complement existing results for the cooperative model (see Browning and Chiappori
(1998), Chiappori and Ekeland (2006, 2009) and Donni (2009)) and the noncooper-
ative model without caring (see Lechene and Preston (2005, 2008)). In this respect,
a fruitful starting point may be the study of d'Aspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira
(2009), who consider a dierential characterization of an alternative model that is
situated between the fully cooperative and noncooperative models.23
Finally, we have considered a static framework, and abstracted from dynamic (or
intertemporal) considerations in household consumption behavior. Clearly, develop-
ing a static model provides a logical rst step towards dening a dynamic model. For
example, if one assumes intertemporal separability of consumption decisions, then
data consistency with the static model is a necessary condition for data consistency
with any dynamic model. As for establishing a dynamic model of noncooperative
household consumption with caring preferences, one may usefully combine the in-
sights of this paper with the approach developed in Mazzocco (2007), who focused
on fully cooperative household behavior. As for establishing the associated revealed
preference testable conditions, one may fruitfully build on the analysis in Browning
(1989) and Crawford (2010), who considered intertemporal consumption behavior in
a unitary framework.
23In this respect, an important dierence between our model and the model of d'Aspremont
and Dos Santos Ferreira is that our model uses information (e.g. MWTP) for quantities that are
eectively observed (i.e. the equilibrium bundles), while the alternative model of d'Aspremont and
Dos Santos Ferreira requires information for quantities in some unobserved cooperative equilibrium
(associated with the same observation, i.e. prices and income). For example, the fact that our
model only uses observable quantity information allowed us to reformulate the revealed preference
characterization in Proposition 3 in MIP terms. As far as we can see, it is not possible to obtain a
similar MIP formulation for the revealed preference characterization of the model of d'Aspremont
and Dos Santos Ferreira, precisely because this model requires unobservable quantity information.
24Appendix A: proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
The rst order conditions for OP-A and OP-B with respect to the numeraire (i.e.



































































t the Lagrange multipliers of the respective budget constraints.
We start from the following observations:
 Either (1) or (2) must hold with equality. This follows from the fact that qA
t;1
is strictly positive.
 Either (3) or (4) must hold with equality. This follows from the fact that qB
t;1
is strictly positive.
 Either (5) or (6) must hold with equality. This follows from the fact that Qt;k
is strictly positive.
 Not both (1) and (4) have strict inequality.
Proof. We prove ad absurdum. Suppose both (1) and (4) hold with strict
inequality, then by the rst two observations above, it must be that (2) and










































This contradicts Assumption SC.
The above reasoning gives us three possible cases: (i) both (1) and (3) hold with
equality, (ii) both (1) and (4) hold with equality, (iii) both (2) and (4) hold with
equality.











































The inequality in (8) follows from using conditions (2) and (4). The inequality in
(9) follows from (7).
As one of the two conditions (5) or (6) must hold with equality, we have that
that A
k (qA
t ;Qt) + B
k (qB
t ;Qt) = Pt;k. As k was arbitrary, this holds for every public
good. Setting A
t = B
t = 1 demonstrates the proof.












































































































































The inequality in (11) follows from dividing condition (2) by (1) while the inequality
in (12) follows from dividing condition (3) by (4).
Case(iii) This case is analogous to case (i) and is left to the reader.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof of statement 1











satises the denition of a household equilibrium with caring for the utility functions
UA, UB, caring functions W A
t , W B
t , prices pt, Pt and household income Yt.
We need to show that there exist numbers A
t , B
t 2 [0;1] and incomes Y A
t , Y B
t
(with Y A
t + Y B




t g is a household equilibrium with
transfers. Let us rst focus on individual A. For the proof, we will again distinguish
three cases, identical to the cases used in the proof of Proposition 1.
Before we begin, consider the rst order condition for A and B with respect to























Lemma 1 If case (i) or (ii) holds and qA
t;n > 0, then (13) holds with equality for all
private goods s at equilibrium. On the other hand if case (iii) holds and qA
t;n > 0,
then (14) holds with equality for all private goods n at equilibrium.











































a contradiction. A similar reasoning holds for the second part of the Lemma.
Let us now consider the three relevant cases that were also considered in the proof
of Proposition 1:
Case (i) In this case, we set A
t = B



















































Qt the subgradient vectors for UA with respect to qA and Q at
the bundles (qA
















































The rst inequality follows from Lemma 1 and the fact that condition (5) must hold
with equality for case (i). The second inequality follows from the budget constraint
and gives us the desired contradiction.
Case (ii) In this case, we dene B
t and A
























One can easily see that for case (ii), QA






Pt;k, and by negation, A
k (qA
t ;Qt) + B
t B
k (qB
t ;Qt) < Pt;k implies QA
t;k = 0. This im-












































































































Again, we have a contradiction.
29Case (iii) For this last case, we dene A
t = B































































































The equality follows from Lemma (1) and the fact that condition (6) must hold with
equality for case (iii).
This concludes the proof for individual A. The proof for individual B is analogous.
Proof of statement 2
Now assume that for each decision situation t there exist indices A
t , B
t 2 [0;1] and
incomes Y A
t ;Y B




t g satises the denition of an equilib-
rium with transfers for utility functions UA, UB. We need to show that there exist
caring functions W A
t and W B






























t g is a household equilibrium with caring.
We dene the caring functions W A
t (UA;UB) = UA+B
t (A
t =B





t )UA. In this construction, A
t and B
t represent the marginal util-










t ). It is easy to see that these specications satisfy Assumption SC as
long as A
t and B









t = 0 and q
B;A
t = 0. Let us focus on member A and assume on the






























































































































































The rst inequality follows from concavity of the functions UA and UB. The rst
equality follows from the rst order conditions of programs DOP-A and DOP-B for
the private goods. The second inequality follows from the fact that B
t  1, the rst






Proof of Proposition 3
1)2. The data set S = fpt;Pt;qt;Qtgt2T is rationalizable with caring. Because of
Proposition 2, we have for any decision situation t that the household allocation solves
DOP-A and DOP-B. As before, let UM
qM
t and UM
Qt (M = A;B) be the subgradients
for the function UM at bundle (qM
t ;Qt); and A
t and B
t the Lagrange multipliers for


































31The inequalities are replaced by equalities in case the quantities of the goods under
consideration are strictly positive. Next, concavity of the utility functions UA and






























v ) + U
B0
Qv(Qt   Qv):
For all t, dene UA
Qt=A
t =  A
t and UB
Qt=B
t =  B
t , UA(qA



















v ) + 
A



















t (Qt   Qv)

: (16)
To see that this obtains S.3, we make use of the Afriat Theorem (see Afriat (1967)
and Varian (1982)). Specically, the inequalities in (15)-(16) are so-called Afriat
inequalities, and the Afriat Theorem implies that these inequalities are satised
for all t;v if and only if the sets fpt; A
t ;qA




Moreover, at the equilibrium, if A
t;k + B
t B
t;k < Pt;k, then QA
t;k = 0 and, thus,
QB




t;k = Pt;k. This obtains the rst part of S.2. Reversing the roles of
A and B shows the other part of S.2. Similarly, one can verify S.4 and S.5.
2)1. Because the GARP conditions in (S.3) are satised, the Afriat Theorem (men-
tioned above) tells us that there exist positive numbers UA
t , UB
t and strictly positive
numbers A
t and B















v ) + 
A0

















v ) + 
B0
v (Qt   Qv)

:

















v ) + 
A0



















v ) + 
B0
v (Q   Qv)
	
:
Notice that UA and UB are continuous, concave, strictly monotone and that for all
t 2 T, UA(qA
t ;Qt) = UA
t and UB(qB
t ;Qt) = UB
t . See, for example, Varian (1982).
We need to show that the functions UA and UB provide a rationalization of the
data set. For brevity, we only provide the argument for UA, but a straightforwardly
32analogous reasoning applies to UB. For all t 2 T; dene QA
t and QB




t;k < Pt;k then QA
t;k = 0 and QB
t;k = Qt;k, and if A
t A
t;k + B
t;k < Pt;k then
QB
t;k = 0 and QA
t;k = Qt;k (see S.4 and S.5). (If A
t;k+B
t B




then we can randomly allocate Qt;k between QA
t;k and QB
t;k.) Next, consider t 2 T






















































































Then, we have to prove that UA(qA;Q)  UA(qA
t ;Qt). To obtain this result, we
rst note that, by construction,  A
t QA
t = (Pt   B
t  B
t )QA




t;k  Pt;k (which implies  A
t QA  (Pt   B
t B
t )QA), we get  A




t )0(QA   QA


















v ) + 
A0













t ) + 
A0












































This provides the wanted result, i.e. fqA
t ;QA
t g solves DOP-A.
Appendix B: mixed integer characterization
In this appendix, we reformulate the conditions in Proposition 3 in mixed integer
programming (MIP) terms. To obtain this MIP formulation, we dene the binary
variables xM
t;v 2 f0;1g, with xM










RM is the revealed preference relation for individual M 2 fA;Bg. Then, a data
set S satises the necessary and sucient condition for rationalizability as given by
Proposition 3 if and only if the following MIP problem is feasible:




++, binary variables zt;k; xA
t;v;xB











































v ) + 
M0


















t ) + 
M0
v (Qv   Qt); (M.8)
(18)
with Ct a given number for which Ct > Pt;k and Ct > Yt for all t;k.
The explanation is as follows. Constraint (M.5) imposes that the private con-
sumption bundles qA
t and qB
t sum to the observed aggregate quantities qt, as re-
quired by condition S.1. Further, constraints M.1-M.4 comply with condition S.2 in
Proposition 3. Specically, M.1 and M.2 impose the given upper bound restriction
for  A
t and  B
t . Next, M.3 imposes Pt;k  A
t;k + B
t B











t;kg = Pt;k and thus condition S.2 is satised. Finally, constraints M.6-M.8 corre-
spond to the GARP conditions for each individual M (= A or B) (condition S.3 in
Proposition 3). Specically, M.6 states that p0
t(qM
t   qM
v ) +  M0
t (Qt   Qv)  0 im-
plies xM









). Next, constraint M.7 imposes transitivity
of the individual revealed preference relations RM: if xM






























). And M.8 requires p0
v(qM
v   qM
t ) +  M0
v (Qv   Qt)  0 if xM










Clearly, all constraints are linear for xed A
t and B
t . Linearity implies that the
above program can be solved by standard MIP methods for a given data set S. See
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39Table 1: test results (1 = pass; 0 = fail) and power for dierent degrees of intra-
household cooperation
Household 1 A
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
B
0 Pass (0/1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Power 0.160 0.157 0.154 0.159 0.161 0.168 0.168 0.169 0.169 0.170 0.173
0.1 Pass (0/1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Power 0.158 0.157 0.154 0.159 0.161 0.168 0.168 0.169 0.169 0.170 0.173
0.2 Pass (0/1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Power 0.157 0.157 0.154 0.159 0.161 0.168 0.168 0.169 0.169 0.170 0.173
0.3 Pass (0/1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Power 0.157 0.157 0.154 0.159 0.161 0.168 0.168 0.169 0.169 0.170 0.173
0.4 Pass (0/1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Power 0.157 0.157 0.155 0.159 0.161 0.168 0.168 0.169 0.169 0.170 0.173
0.5 Pass (0/1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Power 0.154 0.154 0.154 0.158 0.161 0.168 0.168 0.169 0.169 0.170 0.173
0.6 Pass (0/1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Power 0.160 0.160 0.160 0.159 0.162 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.170 0.173
0.7 Pass (0/1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Power 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.171 0.170 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.170 0.173
0.8 Pass (0/1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Power 0.168 0.168 0.168 0.168 0.168 0.168 0.168 0.168 0.169 0.170 0.173
0.9 Pass (0/1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Power 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.169 0.170 0.173
1 Pass (0/1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Power 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173
Household 2 A
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
B
0 Pass (0/1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
Power 0.108 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.100 0.104 0.106 0.103 0.105 0.107 0.108
0.1 Pass (0/1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
Power 0.108 0.103 0.102 0.102 0.099 0.103 0.105 0.103 0.105 0.107 0.108
0.2 Pass (0/1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
Power 0.109 0.103 0.101 0.101 0.099 0.103 0.105 0.103 0.105 0.107 0.108
0.3 Pass (0/1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
Power 0.107 0.104 0.101 0.101 0.099 0.102 0.104 0.103 0.105 0.107 0.108
0.4 Pass (0/1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Power 0.108 0.107 0.105 0.103 0.101 0.102 0.104 0.103 0.105 0.107 0.108
0.5 Pass (0/1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Power 0.107 0.107 0.105 0.103 0.101 0.103 0.105 0.104 0.105 0.107 0.108
0.6 Pass (0/1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Power 0.103 0.103 0.104 0.103 0.101 0.103 0.104 0.104 0.105 0.107 0.108
0.7 Pass (0/1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Power 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.104 0.104 0.105 0.107 0.108
0.8 Pass (0/1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Power 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.105 0.106 0.108 0.108
0.9 Pass (0/1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Power 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.105 0.106 0.108 0.108
1 Pass (0/1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Power 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108 40